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TITLE: CHINA HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1994
AUTHOR: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DATE: FEBRUARY 1995
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
Changes in the economic structure, including the growing
diversity of employment opportunities and the increasing market
orientation of many work units, are undermining the ability of
the authorities to monitor and regulate personal and family
life as closely as in the past, particularly in rural areas.
In urban areas, however, most people still depend on their
government-linked work unit for housing, permission to have a
child, approval to apply for a passport, and other aspects of
ordinary life. The work unit, along with the neighborhood
committee, is charged with monitoring activities and attitudes.
Although the law requires search warrants before security
forces can search premises, this provision is often ignored.
In addition, both the Public Security Bureau and procuracy
apparently can issue search warrants on their own authority.
The 1982 Constitution states that "freedom and privacy of
correspondence of citizens ... are protected by law," but in
practice, authorities record some telephone conversations and
some mail is opened and censored. Government security organs
monitor and sometimes restrict contact between foreigners and
Chinese citizens, particularly dissidents. Rules issued in
July implementing the State Security Law define "activities of
individuals outside the country (including non-Chinese citizens
resident in China) who disregard dissuasion and meet with
personnel in the country who have endangered state security or
who are seriously suspected of endangering state security" as a
violation of the State Security Law.
The Government has continued its effort to control citizens'
access to outside sources of information, selectively jamming
Chinese language broadcasts of the Voice of America (VOA) and
British Broadcasting Corporation. The effectiveness of the
jamming varies considerably by region, with audible signals of
VOA and other broadcasters reaching most parts of China.
China's population has roughly doubled in the past 40 years to
1.18 billion people. In the 1970's and 1980's, China adopted a
comprehensive and highly intrusive one-child family planning
policy. This policy most heavily affects Han Chinese in urban
areas. Urban couples seldom obtain permission to have a second
child. However, exceptions are allowed for the 70 percent of
Han who live in rural areas, and ethnic minorities are subject
to less stringent population controls. Enforcement of the
family planning policy is inconsistent, varying widely from
place to place and year to year.
The population control policy relies on education, propaganda,
and economic incentives, as well as more coercive measures,
including psychological pressure and economic penalties.
Rewards for couples who adhere to the policy include monthly
stipends and preferential medical and educational benefits.
Disciplinary measures against those who violate the policy
include fines, withholding of social services, demotion, and
other administrative punishments, such as loss of employment.
Unpaid fines have sometimes resulted in confiscation or
destruction of personal property. Because penalties for excess
births can be levied against local officials and the mothers'
work units, many individuals are affected, providing multiple
sources of pressure.
Physical compulsion to submit to abortion or sterilization is
not authorized, but Chinese officials acknowledge privately
that there are instances of forced abortions and
sterilizations. Officials maintain that, when discovered,
responsible officials are disciplined and undergo retraining.
They admit, however, that stronger punishment is rare.
Individuals can also sue officials who have exceeded their
authority in implementing family planning policy, but
government officials have not provided data on the number of
successful suits on these grounds.
Regulations forbid sex-selective abortion, but because of the
traditional preference for male children, particularly in rural
areas, some families have used ultrasound to identify and abort
female fetuses. Use of ultrasound for this purpose was
specifically prohibited by the Maternal and Child Health Law
passed in October, which prescribes penalties for medical
practitioners who violate this provision. The Chinese press
has reported that the ratio of male to female births is 114 to
100, based on a nationwide average, while the statistical norm
is 106 male births to 100 female. The ratio excludes many
female births, especially the second or third in a family,
which are unreported to permit the parents to keep trying to
conceive a boy, but may also reflect the abuse of sonography.
Female infanticide may also be a factor in some areas of China.
At least five provincial governments have implemented
regulations seeking to prevent people with severe mental
handicaps from having children. In October China passed a
national Maternal and Child Care Law calling for premarital and
prenatal examinations to determine whether couples have acute
infectious diseases, certain mental illnesses (not including
mental retardation), or are at risk for passing on debilitating
genetic diseases. The law goes into effect on June 1, 1995,
and implementing regulations defining which diseases or
conditions will be covered have not yet been completed. The
law will be implemented by the Ministry of Health, not the
State Family Planning Commission, and while it includes
provisions for abortion or sterilization in some cases based on
medical advice, it provides for obtaining a second opinion and
mandates that patients or their guardians give written consent
to such procedures. (See also Section 5 on People with
Disabilities.)
There were no reported cases of prosecution of parents for
teaching their children religion in the privacy of their home.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Although the Constitution states that freedom of speech and
freedom of the press are fundamental rights enjoyed by all
Chinese citizens, the Government interprets the Communist
Party's "leading role" as circumscribing these rights. It does
not permit citizens to publish or broadcast criticism of senior
leaders or opinions that contradict basic Communist Party
doctrine, which provides for a Socialist state under the
party's leadership. The Government and party maintained strict
control over published expression of dissenting views in 1994.
Public security authorities briefly detained several foreign
journalists in March, April, and May after they had interviewed
or attempted to interview noted dissidents or their relatives.
Under China's State Security Law, "official secrets" are
broadly defined, and interpretation is left to the Ministries
of State Security and Public Security. Hong Kong reporter Xi
Yang was convicted of "spying and stealing state secrets" after
a closed trial in March. He was sentenced to 12 years'
imprisonment and 2 years' deprivation of political rights for
allegedly obtaining "financial and economic secrets," including
information on China's interest rates and plans to sell gold.
Tian Ye, the bank official who allegedly supplied Xi with the
information, was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment and 3
years' deprivation of political rights. After a closed trial,
former journalist Gao Yu was sentenced to 6 years' imprisonment
in November for "leaking state secrets abroad." (See Section
1.e.)
The party and the Government continue to control print and
broadcast media and compel them to propagate the currently
acceptable ideological line. In June press guidelines called
on reporters to protect state secrets, avoid corruption, and
not publicize "sensitive subjects." Despite these admonitions,
the lively tabloid sector continued to expand in 1994, while
circulation of major propaganda-oriented dailies continued to
decline. Radio talk shows remained popular, and, while
generally avoiding politically sensitive subjects, they
provided opportunities to air grievances about public issues.
A small but rapidly growing segment of the population has
access to satellite television broadcasts. Satellite
television dishes are widely available for sale, and a
licensing scheme begun in October 1993, which controls purchase
and possession of the equipment, has been implemented at best
unevenly.
The Government's ability to control the production and
dissemination of publications continued to diminish in 1994.
Fierce competition and dwindling government subsidies have
increased opportunities for private publishers and
booksellers. Some credible estimates hold that, at the end of
1993, as much as one-third of all books were being published
through these unsanctioned channels. In April officials
announced the number of licensed publications would be frozen
at current levels. Shenzhen authorities confiscated a thousand
copies of "Tendency Quarterly" and briefly detained its founder
in January. In May 45 newspapers and periodicals were banned
for illegally reselling their publishing licenses. Seven film
directors were banned in March for entering their works in an
overseas film festival without going through official channels.
The Government has continued to impose heavy ideological
controls on colleges, universities, and research institutes.
As a result, many intellectuals and scholars, fearing that
books or papers on political topics would be deemed too
sensitive to be published, feel compelled to exercise
self-censorship. In areas such as economic policy or legal
reform, there was greater official tolerance for comment and
criticism.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
While the Constitution provides for freedom of peaceful
assembly and association, the Government severely restricted
these rights in practice. The Constitution provides, for
example, that such activities may not infringe "upon the
interests of the State"; protests against the political system
or its leaders are prohibited. Although some small-scale
demonstrations on nonpolitical grievances are tolerated in
practice, demonstrations involving expression of dissident
political views are denied permits and suppressed if held.
Police detained Zhou Guoqiang and Yuan Hongbing in March,
reportedly in part due to their presentation of a petition on
human rights and worker rights to the NPC during its annual
plenary session. Press reports from a Chinese-controlled
service also accused Zhou of planning to sell "political"
T-shirts while the NPC was in session.
The Communist Party organizes and controls most professional
and other mass associations. Regulations promulgated in 1990
require all organizations to be officially registered and
approved. Ostensibly aimed at secret societies and criminal
gangs, the regulations also deter the formation of unauthorized
political or labor organizations. Authorities in Shanghai
refused to allow several individuals to register a proposed
"human rights association," and some members of the group were
subsequently detained (see Section 4). In March Liu Nianchun
was denied permission to register the Association for
Protection of Labor Rights; Liu himself was detained in May but
released in October. No charges were filed against him.
c. Freedom of Religion
The Government subjects religious freedom to restrictions of
varying severity, although the number of believers continues to
grow. While the Constitution affirms toleration of religious
beliefs, government regulations restrict religious practice to
government-controlled religious organizations and registered
places of worship. The Government supervises the publication
of religious material for distribution. There are persistent
complaints that the number of Bibles and other religious
materials allowed to be printed falls far short of demand.
Religious affairs bureaus, which are staffed by officials who
rarely are religious believers, provide "guidance and
supervision" over implementation of government regulations on
religion. In a Catholic seminary in Chengdu, all the
seminarians walked out in April to protest party interference
in the operation of the school. Communist Party officials
state that party membership and religious belief are
incompatible. This places a serious limitation on religious
believers, since party membership is required for almost all
high positions in government and state-owned businesses.
There are no specific bans on particular religious groups, but
the treatment of religious believers and organizations varies
widely. Unregistered or "house" church leaders and members are
harassed in some regions but tolerated in others.
Nonmainstream sects are often singled out. Credible reports
indicate members of an evangelical sect known as "Shouters"
continued to be harassed, detained, fined, and imprisoned in
Henan after the group was deemed "counterrevolutionary" in 1984.
After forcefully suppressing all religious observances during
the 1966-76 Cultural Revolution, the Government began in the
late 1970's to restore or replace damaged or confiscated
churches, temples, mosques, and monasteries. The official
religious organizations administer more than a dozen Catholic
and Protestant seminaries, nine institutes to train Imams and
Islamic scholars, and institutes to train Buddhist monks.
Students who attend these institutes must demonstrate
"political reliability," and all graduates must pass an
examination on their theological and political knowledge to
qualify for the clergy. The Government permitted some Catholic
seminarians, Muslim clerics, and Buddhist clergy to go abroad
for additional religious studies in 1994.
The authorities permit officially sanctioned religious
organizations to maintain international contacts as long as
these do not entail foreign control. In January China
promulgated regulations on religious practices by foreigners
and on places of religious activities. The regulations
codified many existing rules, including a ban on proselytizing
by foreigners, but allow foreign nationals to preach to
foreigners, bring in religious materials for their own use, and
preach to Chinese in churches, mosques, and temples at the
invitation of registered religious organizations. In practice,
some discreet proselytizing and distribution of religious texts
by foreigners outside official channels is tolerated.
Buddhists are by far the largest body of religious believers in
China. The Government estimates that there are 100 million
Chinese Buddhists, most of whom are from the dominant Han
ethnic group. (A discussion of government restrictions on
Tibetan Buddhism can be found in the addendum to this report.)
According to government figures, there are 17 million Muslims
in China. In some areas with large Muslim populations,
officials continue to restrict the building of mosques and the
religious education of youths under 18. Following the 1990
unrest in Xinjiang, the authorities issued regulations further
restricting religious activities and teaching. Ningxia
authorities issued regulations in July forbidding religious
bodies from interfering in administrative affairs, including
education, marriage, and family planning.
China permits Muslim citizens to make the hajj to Mecca, and
the number of those making the hajj has significantly increased
in recent years. About 3,000 officially sponsored Chinese made
the hajj in 1993; many more traveled at their own expense.
The number of Christians continues to grow rapidly. Only those
Christian churches affiliated with either the Catholic
Patriotic Association or the (Protestant) Three Self Patriotic
Movement, which the Government established in the 1950's to
eliminate perceived foreign domination of Christian groups, may
operate openly.
Active unofficial religious movements pose an alternative to
the state-regulated churches, although in some areas there is
tacit cooperation between official and unofficial churches.
The unofficial, Vatican-affiliated, Catholic Church claims a
membership far larger than the 4 million registered with the
official Catholic Church, though actual figures are unknown.
In addition to the 6 million persons who are officially counted
as following Protestantism, a large number of Protestants
worship privately in "house churches" that are independent of
government control.
There continued to be credible reports in 1994 of efforts by
authorities in some areas to rein in activities of the
unapproved Catholic and Protestant movements, including raiding
and closing a number of unregistered churches. Two Protestant
house churches in Shenzhen were reportedly closed and their
leaders briefly detained. Several Hong Kong-based Christian
missionaries were detained for a few days in Henan in February
for violating regulations on religious activities by
foreigners; several Chinese Christians also detained in
connection with the incident were released later. In November,
in another town in Henan, a preacher from Taiwan and 152 local
Christians were reportedly detained on charges of unauthorized
proselytizing by foreigners (under the January religious
regulations, Chinese from Hong Kong and Taiwan are covered by
the rules governing foreigners). Ten are still in custody; the
rest reportedly were released after paying fines of
approximately $118 (1,000 RMB). The Guangzhou house church of
Pastor Samuel Lamb (Lin Xiangao) continued to operate openly
but was subject to limited harassment by the authorities.
Elsewhere, authorities tolerate the existence of unofficial
Catholic and Protestant churches as long as they remain small
and discreet.
A number of religious activists remained imprisoned in 1994.
There was some evidence that authorities have increasingly used
short-term detentions, rather than long prison terms when
dealing with unauthorized religious activities. Pan Yiyuan,
leader of a house church in Fujian, was detained in March and
released in December. Wei Jingyi was redetained in January in
Hebei less than a year after finishing a 3-year sentence to
reeducation through labor. Two church members from Anhui were
reportedly sentenced to 2 years' reeducation through labor in
September, reportedly for contacting "anti-China overseas
organizations." Father Gu Zheng was reportedly detained in
Xinjiang in October for teaching in an unregistered Catholic
seminary. Father Vincent Qin Guoliang was sentenced to 3
years' reeducation through labor in November in Qinghai
province. Bishop Su Zhiming was detained briefly in January
after meeting with a visiting U.S. Congressman. Authorities in
Jiangxi reportedly redetained Bishop Zeng Jingmu in September
after holding him for a few days in August. Father Liao
Haiqing, also detained in September, was released in November.
Several other religious activists were released in 1994,
although the whereabouts of some reported to have been released
could not be confirmed, and others remained under some
restrictions. Pei Ronggui and Jia Zhiguo were released in late
January or early February; Zhang Ruiyu, Chen Zhuman, Cui Tai,
Yan Peizhi, Xu Zhihe and Zhang Li were released in May. In
April a visiting American religious figure was told that Han
Dingxiang, Fan Zhongliang, Liu Guangdong, and others had been
released. In November the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Religious
Intolerance made a 10-day visit to China, including Tibet, at
the invitation of the Chinese Government.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The effectiveness of the Government's identification card
system used to control and restrict individual residence
location within the country continued to erode in 1994. The
"floating population" migrating to China's urban areas from the
countryside is estimated at anywhere from 50 to 100 million.
In January the Government announced the household registration
system would be revamped to adapt to the new situation.
However, because this itinerant population lacks official
status, access to housing, schooling, and the full range of
employment opportunities can be restricted.
Some former inmates have been denied permission, under the
"staying at prison employment" system, to return to their
homes, a provision applicable to those incarcerated in both the
"reform through labor" and the "reeducation through labor"
systems. For those assigned to camps far from their
residences, this constitutes a form of internal exile. The
number of prisoners subject to this restriction is unknown.
Others have reportedly been forced to accept jobs in state
enterprises where they can be more closely supervised after
their release from prison or detention.
The Government routinely permits legal emigration and most
foreign travel. There was progress during 1994 in several
cases in which the Government had denied passports for
political reasons. Legal scholar Yu Haocheng finally obtained
a passport and exit permit in May, as did several relatives of
dissidents currently residing abroad. Although regulations
promulgated in 1990 require college graduates to repay the cost
of their free postsecondary education by working for 5 years
before going abroad, students wishing to go abroad still manage
to obtain passports. The Government continues to use political
attitudes as a major criterion in selecting people for
government-sponsored study abroad.
The Government continued its efforts to attract persons who
have studied overseas back to China. Official media have said
that before returning home, Chinese citizens who have joined
foreign organizations hostile to China should quit them and
refrain from activities which violate Chinese law. The
authorities continued to refuse to allow labor activist Han
Dongfang to return to China after revoking his passport in 1993
on the grounds that he engaged in activities hostile to China
while overseas. In November authorities stopped poet Bei Dao
at Beijing Airport and reportedly interrogated him overnight
about his position as director of Human Rights in China, a
U.S.-based organization. He was then refused entry into
China. Some former student leaders who were active in the 1989
Tiananmen demonstrations reportedly continue to have difficulty
getting permission to return to China.
The Government accepts the repatriation of citizens who have
entered other countries or territories illegally. In 1994, in
addition to the routine return of Chinese illegal immigrants
found in Hong Kong, the Government permitted the return of
several large groups of illegal immigrants from other countries.
Citizens illegally smuggled to other countries are often
detained for a short time to determine identity and any past
criminal record or involvement in smuggling activities. As a
deterrent and to recover local costs incurred during the
repatriation, the authorities in some areas levy a fine of
$1,000 or more on returnees.
Currently there is no law authorizing the authorities to grant
refugee status, and they generally repatriate persons of other
nationalities seeking to be recognized as refugees. The
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Public Security, and Civil
Affairs, in collaboration with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees, are writing legislation that would allow China to
honor its obligation as a party since 1982 to the Geneva
Convention in regard to refugees.
Although the Government denies having tightened its policy on
accepting Vietnamese refugees, in recent years very few such
refugees have actually been resettled in China. China has not
signed the Comprehensive Plan of Action negotiated at the
Geneva International Conference on Indochinese Refugees in
1989, but it generally has abided by its principles.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens lack the means to change their government legally and
cannot freely choose or change the laws and officials that
govern them. Citizens vote directly only for county-level
people's congress delegates. People's congress delegates at
the provincial level are selected by county-level people's
congresses, and in turn provincial-level people's congresses
select delegates to the National People's Congress. According
to the 1982 Constitution, the National People's Congress (NPC)
is the highest organ of state power. It elects the President
and Vice President, decides on the choice of the Premier, and
elects the Chairman of the Central Military Commission. In
some elections (but not for the central Government positions
chosen by the NPC), voters are offered more candidates than
positions, allowing a modest degree of choice among officially
approved candidates. There were credible reports that the
candidates most favored by authorities were defeated in some
local elections, particularly at the village level.
There are no restrictions placed on the participation of women
or minority groups in the political process, and women make up
14 percent of Communist Party membership. However, the
election and agenda of people's congresses at all levels remain
under tight control by the Communist Party, the paramount
source of political authority in China. The Constitution was
amended in 1993 to ratify the existence of small "democratic"
parties, but these play only a minor consultative role at most,
and all pledge allegiance to the Communist Party. Thus, the
Communist Party retains an explicit monopoly on political
decisionmaking.
The requirement that associations register and be approved
makes it difficult for independent interest groups to form and
affect the system. Several persons who petitioned the NPC
calling for greater attention to human rights and workers'
rights, including Zhou Guoqiang, Yuan Hongbing, and others,
were detained by authorities in March and April. Zhou Guoqiang
was sentenced in September to 3 years' reeducation through
labor (see Section 1.e.).